Rand on the Insurgency
If they don't have money, they won't be able to fight. Thus goes an old argument regarding insurgencies, which Keith Crane from RAND is recycling for Iraq. He offers a 5 point plan to make it happen.
It is important to first understand where they get the funding: "Militias and insurgents in Iraq obtain funds from four major sources: government payrolls; the resale and smuggling of gasoline and diesel fuel; extortion, robberies, and kidnappings; and other countries. " It is unclear which is the largest source of income. Sadr apparently funds his militia through the payrolls of Ministries of Agriculture, Transportation and Health, but there is plenty of money from other sources.
According to Crane, if the US and Iraqi government can control these sources of revenue ("starving them of cash") we will have better success at ending the insurgency.
Crane's argument ignores the fundamental problems in the conflict and the difficulty of stopping an insurgency in this way. As another old addage goes, where there's a will there's a way. The Colombian government tried "starving" the FARC by spraying coca fields, but the guerrillas would move production or shift to other revenue sources, such as kidnapping.
Slowing the funding for guns and bombs is certainly important, but does not address the fundamental political problem in Iraq. As Crane rightfully points out, "Bombs and bullets have failed to stop Iraq's insurgents and militia fighters," and it's time for a new tact.
Posted by Peter
It is important to first understand where they get the funding: "Militias and insurgents in Iraq obtain funds from four major sources: government payrolls; the resale and smuggling of gasoline and diesel fuel; extortion, robberies, and kidnappings; and other countries. " It is unclear which is the largest source of income. Sadr apparently funds his militia through the payrolls of Ministries of Agriculture, Transportation and Health, but there is plenty of money from other sources.
According to Crane, if the US and Iraqi government can control these sources of revenue ("starving them of cash") we will have better success at ending the insurgency.
Crane's argument ignores the fundamental problems in the conflict and the difficulty of stopping an insurgency in this way. As another old addage goes, where there's a will there's a way. The Colombian government tried "starving" the FARC by spraying coca fields, but the guerrillas would move production or shift to other revenue sources, such as kidnapping.
Slowing the funding for guns and bombs is certainly important, but does not address the fundamental political problem in Iraq. As Crane rightfully points out, "Bombs and bullets have failed to stop Iraq's insurgents and militia fighters," and it's time for a new tact.
Posted by Peter
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