Troop Surges
For some useful primers on why sending more troops to Iraq is not the panacea its proponents make it out to be go here, here, and here.
Posted by Kingston
Using an expensive education to ramble about Economics, Politics and English Beer
Sen. John McCain took his controversial proposal for curbing Iraq' sectarian violence to Baghdad on Thursday, calling for an additional 15,000 to 30,000 U.S. troops.
As Sen. Feingold has pointed out, it's striking that not one member of the Iraq Study Group spoke out against the war before it happened, or even raised doubts in public. One of the truly amazing things about the political and media scene today is this: not only are people who cheered on this grotesque mistake still taken seriously, there seems to be an unwritten rule that ONLY people who supported the war get to make pronouncements on national security. Somehow, the likes of John McCain, who has been wrong every step of the way, are considered more credible on this issue than people like Howard Dean, who has been right at every point. Go figure.
I applaud the ISG's endorsement of a surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad. Such a step is long overdue. But the coalition should not characterize such a redeployment as "short-term" or place a timetable on its presence.
Posted by Peter
We were told that there are fewer than 10 analysts on the job at the Defense Intelligence Agency who have more than two years’ experience in analyzing the insurgency. Capable analysts are rotated to new assignments, and on-the-job training begins anew. Agencies must have a better personnel system to keep analytic expertise focused on the insurgency. They are not doing enough to map the insurgency, dissect it, and understand it on a national and provincial level. The analytic community’s knowledge of the organization, leadership, financing, and operations of militias, as well as their relationship to government security forces, also falls far short of what policy makers need to know.Posted by Kingston
In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter to keep events out of reports and databases. A murder of an Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of a sectarian attack, that assault does not make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn’t hurt U.S. personnel doesn’t count. For example, on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals.
Graham: The president of Iran has publicly disavowed the existence of the Holocaust, has publicly stated that he would like to wipe Israel off the map. Do you think he's kidding?Indeed. Who could possibly have the temerity to suggest that Iran might consider its own survival to be a more important goal than seeking holy martyrdom via the destruction of Israel? Doesn't that mushy liberal Gates understand that the threat of massive mililtary retaliation has no influnece on Iran's decisionmaking calculus? In fact, I bet the liberal mainstream media has already convinced him that a Pentagon has six sides instead of five...
Gates: No, I don't think he's kidding, but I think there are, in fact, higher powers in Iran than he, than the president. And I think that, while they are certainly pressing, in my opinion, for nuclear capability, I think that they would see it in the first instance as a deterrent.
So the choice is between a terrible decision and one that is even worse. The terrible decision is just to begin leaving, knowing that even more innocent civilians will be killed and that we’ll be dealing with agitation out of Iraq for years to come. The worse decision would be to wait another year, or two, or three and then take that terrible course. If we thought a longer commitment and presence would lead to a better outcome, then the extra commitment might be sensible. But nothing occurring in Iraq in the last year has given rise to any hope that things are getting better rather than worse. (This, by the way, is the reason I have changed my mind: the absence of evidence that the chances for a “decent” departure will improve.)In refutation of this view, a vociferous chorus of neocons and liberal hawks are arguing that we need to make a last ditch effort to save Iraq by plugging another 20,000-50,000 troops into the cyclonic shitstorm that is Baghdad. This is of course ridiculous and doesn't deserve serious consideration. First, in terms of American domestic politics, it simply ain't gonna happen. Second, and more importantly, it naively assumes that all our problems in Iraq can be chalked up to a lack of security. The unrelenting cycle of blood-letting between Sunni and Shia, however, has taken on a life of its own. Adding more troops now isn't likely to ameliorate the fundamental social and political divisions that are tearing Iraq apart. In fact, given that not even the Iraqi Shia want us in their country anymore, it seems more likely that an influx of Amerian troops would only serve to exacerbate the situation.